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Footnote to History

How Lumumba Came to Power

BY RENE LEMARCHAND

THE Congolese general elections represented the final phase of a process of political transfer which formally began in January of this year at the Brussels Roundtable Conference. At Brussels, it was agreed that the legislative powers in the independent Congo would be exercised by a Chamber of Representatives of 137 members elected by universal suffrage on the basis of one deputy for every 100,000 inhabitants, and a Senate "composed essentially of members designated by the Provincial Assemblies on the basis of 14 Senators for each Province, including three customary chiefs or notables." Moreover, 12 additional members may be added to the Upper Chamber by "co-optation" of the elected Senators on the basis of two from each Province. A monocameral system was adopted at the Provincial level.

The Party System

Unstable as the Congolese situation is at this time, the pattern of political groups discernible at the federal and provincial levels must still reservedly be identified with a "party-system." Within this system, there are two major categories—"national" and "regional" parties.

The former, characterized by a "territory-wide" organization and a "modernist" outlook, include those parties which supported candidates in all or several of the six provinces. They are represented by Patrice Lumumba's *MNC* (*Mouvement National Congolais*), the *MNC* dissident wing of Albert Kalonji, Paul Bolya's *PNP* (*Parti National du Progres*), and Jean Bolikango's *PUNA* (*Parti de l'Unité Nationale*), whose appeal is in effect limited to the Bangala of the Leopoldville and Equator Provinces.

The regional parties, too numerous to be exhaustively inventoried, are not necessarily traditionally-oriented, but they all draw support from distinctive tribal entities. As a result, their electoral campaign was limited to specific provinces or districts. They are represented in Leopoldville Province by two important groups radically different in their doctrinal outlooks and bases of support, Joseph Kasavubu's *ABAKO* (*Association des Bakongo*) and Antoine Gizenga's *PSA* (*Parti Solidaire Africain*); in the Katanga by Moïse Tshombe's *CONAKAT* (*Confederation des Natis du Katanga*) and Jason Sendwe's *Balubakat*; in the Kasai by the *UNC* (*Union Nationale Congolaise*) and the *MSM* (*Mouvement Solidaire Muluba*); in Equator by the *UNIMO* (*Union*

Mongo); and in the Kivu by the *CEREA* (*Centre de Regroupement Africain*).

Regional Parties Predominate

With one important exception, "national" parties were less successful than "regional" ones in terms of seats won. Kalonji's and Bolya's "national" parties suffered relative defeats with eight seats each, and Bolikango's won only seven seats. On the other hand, Lumumba's *MNC* emerged as the strongest party in the Chamber of Representatives, with 33 seats out of 137. Subsequently three minor parties of the Kasai—the *Coaka* and the *UNC*, holding three seats each, and the *Mouvement d'Unité Bangala*, with one seat—entered an alliance with Mr. Lumumba's party, which brought his total up to 40 seats.

The tribally-based *PSA* and *ABAKO* are the second and third largest parties, holding respectively 13 and 12 seats. The *CONAKAT* and the *CEREA* won eight seats each. The remaining 56 seats are distributed in varying proportion among some 19 parties of purely local interest.

Provincial Assemblies Analyzed

The relative strength of the parties competing at the provincial level is mirrored by the balance of forces in

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each of the Provincial Assemblies:

(1) The *MNC*-Lumumba commands an overwhelming majority of the seats in the Assembly of the Orientale Province and is therefore in a position to manage provincial affairs there free of all meaningful opposition.

(2) Lumumba's party also acquired a dominant position in the Kasai Province through the alliance mentioned earlier. In spite of the fact that it only captured 16 out of 70 seats in Kasai, whereas its immediate opponent, the Kalonji-*MNC*, gained 21, the scales were automatically tipped in its favor once it joined forces with the *UNC*, the *Coaka* and the *Basonge* of Kabinda. The "cartel" controlled by Mr. Lumumba's party then commanded 37 seats in the Assembly, which is more than 50 percent of the membership.

(3) In Leopoldville Province, the Assembly was almost evenly split be-

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Patrice Lumumba at a news conference

—Wide World

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
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COVER PHOTOGRAPH:

Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, Prime Minister of the Northern Region of Nigeria, presents New York's Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller with a ceremonial robe following a dinner in the Nigerian leader's honor given by the African-American Institute in New York. At left is Alhaji Isa Kaita, Minister of Education for the Northern Region. Further details on their visit are on page 16 of this issue.

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The task of the Congolese soldier on Independence Day was a thankless one.

—photo by Larry Burrows

Mutiny in the Congo: The Linchpin Gives Way

THE chaos, confusion, and violence which began in the Congo less than a week after independence was not unexpected, but it originated in a most unexpected quarter. The initial collapse came, not within the fragile 12-party coalition government or even in direct protest against it, but rather at the country's most stable pillar—in the proud, highly-disciplined *Force Publique*.

For more than 70 years, this combined army-gendarmerie—once a conscripted force but more recently comprised of some 23,000 Congolese enlisted men and non-coms, officered by just over a thousand Belgians—has been the vast Congo's linchpin. But the approach of independence imposed acute new psychological pressures on these troops.

A Thankless Task

Since preparations got underway in the early spring for the May elections, the army had been on almost continuous duty. Newspaper headlines for the months of April to June recorded their demanding and thankless task: "Congo Police Quell Rioters;" "Congo Troops Keep Polls Quiet;" "Congo Troops Enforce Curfew;" "Army Breaks Up Intra-Tribal Scuffle." Often, they were called upon to contain effervescences with which they were fundamentally in sympathy or to put down tribal-political squabbles organized by members of their own tribes.

As late-rising politicians of doubtful qualifications moved dramatically up the social and economic ladder and the general population prepared to celebrate, the army remained a totally colonial institution. The *London Times* reported that many Belgian officers flatly told their troops that independence was "for civilians" and that they should ignore it. Independence Day brought no bonus, no time off to celebrate, and no relaxation of the rigid racial line between officers and men. There was, moreover, no prospect that any of the more than a thousand Belgian officers who ruled the *Force Publique* with a capable but stern hand could be replaced by Congolese before 1962. The first 21 Congolese cadets were sent to Brussels for officers' training only this year.

Although no one paid much attention at the time, there were public signs as early as March that trouble was brewing in the *Force Publique*, or at least that some political parties were trying to capitalize on known grievances. One such example is contained in the April 9 issue of *Emancipation*, the press organ of Alphonse Nguvulu's small but militantly Marxist *Parti du Peuple*, which took up the Congolese soldier's cause with what was purported to be an "open letter from the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the *Force Publique*."

It said in part:

"We, the soldiers of the *Force Publique*, are following with close

attention the present course of politics, and we note with great astonishment that the present colonial government and our good representatives are not considering anything to better our fate. . . . We vehemently condemn the attitude of our representatives and publicly charge as self-centered our present political leaders who ignore our multiple difficulties. . . .

There is no human contact between us and our officers, . . . we are veritable slaves. We are thought of as belonging to an inferior race. So far as Africanization of the staff is concerned, there is total immobility. All of the higher grades are held only by whites even though there are Congolese soldiers capable of assuming the duties of officers. At this time, the unanimous desire of all Congolese soldiers is to occupy posts of command, to earn a decent salary, to put an end to all traces of discrimination in the midst of the *Force Publique*. We take the liberty of declaring publicly and without equivocation that if by June 30 you have not put into operation adequate means to dignify our standard of living and have not moved toward an extensive appointment of black officers, we assure you that the independence of June 30 will be unsteady. . . ."

The First Explosion

The festering bitterness within the army first exploded on July 5 after Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba went to Leopold II camp in Leopoldville to address a unit of troops derived chiefly from the Bangala peoples supporting Jean Bolikango of the PUNA Party. Lumumba had originally supported Bolikango for the presidency, but subsequently dropped him in favor of a more vital political settlement with Joseph Kasavubu of the ABAKO.

Exactly what happened in the course of this meeting is not yet clear. The discussion apparently soon progressed from patriotic generalities to the injustices done Bolikango and then to a dramatic outburst against the "Belgian plot" to prevent a progressive Africanization of the Congolese military. A quick cabinet meeting was convened shortly thereafter and, on Lumumba's recommendation, it was agreed that all Belgian officers should be forthwith replaced by Congolese and that every member of the *Force Publique* would be jumped one grade in rank—leaving this, as *Time* magazine put it, the only army in the world with no privates. President Kasavubu was to be commander-in-chief and a former Congolese sergeant-major, Victor Lundula, would be called back from civilian life to serve as commanding general. How or why Lumumba gave in so quickly to a set of demands so impractical of application on short notice is not clear.

Before any of these "reforms"

THE FORCE PUBLIQUE

- Origin:** Founded under the regime of King Leopold II in 1885. Originally composed largely of volunteers from outside the Congo—predominantly Nigerians—but by 1891 a system of local recruitment had been introduced.
- Purpose:** A combined army-gendarmerie charged with the task of defending the frontiers as well as preserving internal security. Participated successfully in the East African campaign of World War I and in the Abyssinian and Egyptian campaigns of World War II.
- 1960 Size:** 23,070 men, all Congolese. 1,006 officers, all Belgians.
- Recruitment:** Originally a conscripted army, but in recent years all vacancies have been filled on a volunteer basis. Enlistment is for seven years, with reenlistments frequent. Many Congolese have been drawn to the army because of the opportunities for vocational training in fields suitable to later civilian life.
- Organization:** Composed of three *groupements* comprising 4,000 to 6,000 men, an independent brigade, a coastal defence unit, a company of commandos, and an air unit. The main base is at Leopoldville and the central training school at Luluabourg. Each of the three *groupements* is responsible for security in two of the Congo's six provinces.
- Previous Mutinies:** In 1895, recruits from the Batetela tribe mutinied after their tribal chief was shot for offending an officer. Although this uprising was quickly repressed, it broke out again in 1897 and many Belgian officers were killed before it was finally contained in 1901. In 1944, non-commissioned officers and men serving in the Luluabourg area revolted in protest against a change in their commanding officers, with several casualties on both sides.

could be implemented in an orderly manner, if indeed that were possible anyway, the word began to spread to the hinterland—reportedly in messages sent by drum. Some observers believe communist agitators helped spread the word, while others insist that key agitators throughout the country already knew in advance when the call would come. First in Thysville, some 75 miles south of Leopoldville, and subsequently in army centers in every province of the Congo, the cork popped out of the bottle—both literally and figuratively. The Belgian officers were bodily thrown out and roughed up, and there was a high incidence of both drunkenness and rape as the self-liberated troops launched their belated celebration of independence and gave sometimes violent vent to their stored-up resentment of long years of obsequiousness to the white officers and their families.

Panic Distorts

Because people in panic often see events in distorted perspective, it is still difficult to separate fact from rumor in recording any account of the developments in the Congo after July 5. George Sibera, reporting for United Press International, cabled this striking account of the extent of European panic in Leopoldville on July 8:

"Rumor drove the whites—mostly Belgians—to fury. Men with clenched fists shouted unconfirmed reports that African mutineers were raping white women. The re-

ports flew around the city, sometimes embellished. A sound, a car backfiring, was enough to cause a fresh wave of panic. . . . The word rape was all over the European section of Leopoldville.

White men and women burst from their homes in the middle of the night seeking escape. . . . A few dozen Belgian youths arrived waving guns and vowing, "We will fight till we die." One youth suddenly shouted in the refugee-filled embassy gardens: "The Congolese rebels are coming." Almost in the same instant came the distant sound of a rifle shot. That was the trigger. Shouting, screaming, crying, the refugees fled into nearby buildings, behind trees and rocks, any hiding place they could find. Others, zigzagging and looking back fearfully, ran to the river . . . to mob the ferry dock.

. . . The refugees failed to calm down until they actually had entered Brazzaville waters. On the trip across on board the steamer, excited young men kept shouting to women and children to lie on the decks to escape bullets.

But I did not hear a single shot. . . ."

Civilian Role Cited

Time magazine reflected this panic in its issue of July 18, when its lead article declared categorically that the

(Continued on page 15)

Lessons To Be Learned From the Congo

(From The Observer, with permission)

The United Nations' prompt action in sending troops from five carefully balanced African States to the Congo offers the best hope that this new hapless African republic will not lapse into complete chaos. With the arrival of these troops, the Belgians should feel able to withdraw their own forces, and so to lower the tension between themselves and the Congolese. No nation can be expected to stand by passively while 100,000 of its subjects are threatened with violence. Belgium, however, will lose all sympathy if she does anything to encourage the secessionists planning an independent State in Katanga. Any proof of collusion would bring down the weight of international censure on her. However sorely tried the Belgians may feel at this moment, their wisest course lies in avoiding senseless reprisals and fresh adventures that can only lead to greater defeats.

The appalling developments in the Congo should be taken as a warning by other African countries of what could easily happen unless their rulers act with greater prescience than the Belgians. For the germs of violence and disintegration that rotted the Congo are endemic in Algeria, South Africa, South West Africa, the Central African Federation, the Portuguese territories, and possibly in Kenya, too, and in the Horn of Africa.

It is natural that the defenders of the *status quo* should find in these events support for their opposition to an early transfer of power to Africans. But this is a false deduction: to act on it would ensure only greater disasters. The tempo in Africa calls for rapid emancipation; delaying tactics can only mean repression, the surest path to racial violence. But if there are dangers in delaying emancipation, there are dangers also in a quick surrender of power, as the Belgians have discovered. In the balance of danger the advantage lies with emancipation, for only in this way is it possible to plan ahead and to reduce—possibly even to remove altogether—the bitterness and suffering that lie in wait for the privileged groups who, now more than ever, are terrified of what might be their fate should they relax their uncertain control.

What, then, are the true lessons to be learned from the Congo, and what can be done to avoid similar tragedies happening elsewhere? It has become plain that deadly rivalries and tribal schisms are likely to threaten African States once the authoritarian central power is withdrawn. Europeans are likely to be singled out for indiscriminate revenge as a reprisal for years of pent-up feelings of grievance, and such attacks may be difficult to control in the absence of an effective national leadership. There are also dangers of administrative and economic collapse due to the lack of trained Africans at the highest levels of the Army and Civil Service.

If these dangers have so far been avoided elsewhere, it is because British and French colonial governments in West Africa trained some African administrators and allowed them to acquire some experience. This was made easier by the relative absence of large European communities. The situation is less promising in the other African territories awaiting self-government. There is not enough time to repair these years of neglect. What must be done must be done quickly.

The three minimum requirements are a secu-



"I WANT TO PROTECT YOU"

—Herblock, in the Washington Post

rity force capable of maintaining peace while the new political factions work out their common destiny; effective economic aid free from foreign "strings"; and the provision of high-grade administrators and technicians to fill the gap while Africans acquire the training and experience that they may not have received under the previous dispensations.

These three needs can be best supplied through the United Nations, whose reputation stands high in Africa. But if the UN is to become an effective instrument, it must rapidly develop the resources required to perform these tasks.

The UN should, therefore, be instructed to convert its Emergency Forces (in the Middle East and in the Congo) into the cadre of an International Police Force available for committal to any threatened part of the world. It should immediately implement Mr. Hammarskjöld's pigeonholed scheme to create an International Civil Service, whose personnel could be seconded to whatever member State was in need.

The emphasis of such a service must be on disinterestedness and calibre; one thinks of men such as Professor Arthur Lewis, Sir Hugh Foot, and Paul Marc-Henry of France. Men of this stature can command high salaries and distinguished careers in the service of their own countries; hence they are not likely to be available for short-term contracts elsewhere, unless they are permanent members of a new Service.

Finally, there is the need for an effective international programme of economic aid, capable of making a real, as opposed to a token, contribution to the poorer countries.

The UN should be commissioned to act quickly on these three priorities. If the present crisis produces new growth in UN capability, some good may come out of the Congo's evil days.

Economic Notes

Guinea Cuts Trade Gap

The Republic of Guinea has released 1959 figures documenting the rapid narrowing of its trade gap as well as the post-independence change in its trade pattern.

The steadily widening trade gap of the late 1950's has been reversed by holding imports at almost the 1958 level since independence, and by increasing exports. Diamonds, for example, have increased from three to eighteen percent of total exports since 1958. Exports are now almost half as large as imports, compared to only slightly over one-third in 1958. Most of the remaining imbalance is in Guinea's trade with the franc zone outside West Africa.

The sudden drop in Guinea's trade with its neighbors in the old French West Africa, principally Senegal, came late in 1958: the figures for 1959 show a decrease of exports by sea to these areas to less than one-tenth of their 1958 level, and a decrease of imports by sea to about one-fifth of their former total. Prior to 1959, the deficit with this area had accounted for about 18 to 40 percent of Guinea's total deficit; now it is only about five percent.

The 1959 figures showed that the franc zone as a whole is holding its position as supplier of about three-fourths of Guinea's imports, but is taking only about half its exports, compared with three-fourths in 1958.

The effect of Guinea's new trade ties with the Communist bloc also began to show in the 1959 figures, which indicate that 16 percent of Guinea's exports and nine percent of its imports were with the Communist bloc last year, compared to less than one percent for both in pre-independence 1958. Trade was roughly balanced with the bloc; the deficit with Czechoslovakia, which supplied mainly machinery, sugar, and textiles, was covered by a surplus with Poland. Trade with East Germany was more closely balanced, mainly with exports of bananas and imports of rice and wheat.

Jack Report Debated

The Nyasaland Legislative Council recently took up the politically important *Report on an Economic Survey of Nyasaland, 1958-1959*, prepared by a joint Federal and Nyasaland Government Survey Team chaired by Professor D. T. Jack of Durham University, Durham, England. "The evidence is conclusive," the 300-page Report observes, "that the greater rate of economic

development which has occurred since 1953 must be attributed to the constitutional changes which were made in that year and that this greater rate of development could not be maintained if Nyasaland were to depend entirely upon its own resources.

The Survey Team recommends that available resources should be concentrated in agricultural improvement and expansion, communications, water supplies, and power, and that projects generating new income should be emphasized rather than expansion of education, health, and other social services.

African Loans Protested

The London *Financial Times* reports that objections have been raised by Latin American directors of the World Bank to recent Bank loans to African territories for the purpose of increasing production of certain export crops competitive with those produced by Latin American countries. Officials of the Bank described the protests, which have been from Nicaragua and Colombia and concern cotton and coffee, as a "mild dispute" within the Board of Directors, and emphasized that these views were not unanimously supported by the Latin American members.

DLF Helps Liberian Bank

The US Government's Development Loan Fund (DLF) agreed on June 15 to guarantee \$1,000,000 of Bank of Monrovia developmental loans to Liberian private industry. An affiliate of the First National City Bank of New York and Liberia's leading commercial bank, the Bank of Monrovia will undertake a program of granting long term loans to small entrepreneurs to support the growth of such local industries as cocoa production, lumbering, repair and maintenance shops, rice milling, rubber production, trucking and transportation, and clothing manufacture.

This is the first time a US Government agency has established such a relationship with a private commercial bank. The arrangement permits DLF to provide credit facilities for small private borrowers in an underdeveloped area, a service which it cannot provide directly because of the administrative difficulties involved. The Liberian firm, on its part, is enabled to make long-term loans of a type usually impractical for a commercial bank.

—Norman W. Mosher

24 Nigerian Students Win US Assistance

In a pilot project administered by the African-American Institute in cooperation with 24 American universities and colleges, 24 Nigerian students have been awarded four-year scholarships to study in the United States.

The winners, 21 men and three women, were selected from about 2,000 applicants by means of a rigid testing and screening procedure under both Nigerian and American college standards. Final recommendations were made by a joint Nigerian-American Scholarship Board, including leading Nigerian educators and two representatives of the cooperating American colleges—David Henry, Director of Admissions of Harvard University, and Rixford Snyder, Director of Admissions at Stanford University.

Eight of the men plan to study engineering; eight will study in the field of biological sciences; and three plan to become teachers. Of the women, two plan to study teaching and one will study biological science. The winners will be distributed among 19 colleges—three of which are women's colleges. Since there were only three women winners, five of the eight women's colleges participating were unable to accept winners this year. It is expected there will be sufficient women winners next year to go around.

Five colleges accepted two men each. They are Harvard, Yale, Princeton, Columbia, and Stanford. Other colleges participating are: Amherst, Barnard, Brandeis, Brown, Bryn Mawr, Cornell, Dartmouth, Haverford, University of Minnesota, Mt. Holyoke, Notre Dame, Oberlin, Pembroke, University of Pennsylvania, Radcliffe, Smith, Swarthmore, Vassar, and Wellesley.

The colleges and universities to which the winners will go will provide room, board, tuition, fees and other basic expenses. The Nigerian Government will pay transportation to this country and back.

The Council on Student Travel, an organization in New York which arranges group transportation for international students, has reserved space on the *Queen Frederika*, a Greek ship, for the 24 Nigerian winners. The ship will sail from Naples, Italy, July 26 for New York. While aboard ship, a special orientation program has been arranged to acquaint the students with American customs, traditions, travel problems, the universities they will attend and other information.

THE MALAWI PARTY

A Close-up of Nyasaland's "Government-in Waiting"

THE first impression of the Malawi Party must certainly be one of its strength and popularity. One senses this in the crowded Malawi offices at Limbe—not very grand, certainly, but with an elaboration of apparatus quite unlike any other African organization in the Federation. Outside are a couple of the party's "fleet" of Land Rovers, material tokens of the remarkable financial prosperity of Malawi. Inside, the party officers show off their filing system and talk expansively of building a new office block more suitable to the dignity of the government to be.

The Author

The article on this page was written by Terence Ranger, one of the three owners of the periodical *Dissent* in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia. It is reprinted from *Dissent* with permission.

One senses it again at the meeting of a rural branch in the Northern Province. It is the first public meeting since the emergency, although a flourishing Malawi branch already exists. In the area outside a hut, on a hillside overlooking the lake, the people gather. In part it is like the traditional village meeting. There sits the headman in his furred cap. There are the village elders, privileged to interrupt the proceedings with long speeches or accepted comic turns or, if nothing else, a shout of "Kwaca."

But there are also other elements. The Chairman is the headmaster of the local primary school. Other officers include the senior orderly at the mission hospital, who has to address the gathering in English since he cannot yet speak Citumbuka, and a technical trainee. Moreover, the women and the young men are more in evidence—as is appropriate at a meeting which is concerned with the foundation of the local branches of the Women's League and the Youth League of the Malawi Congress Party. There can be no doubt, watching the meeting, of the solidity and the solidarity of Malawi support.

Or again one senses it as one meets the Malawi Land Rovers tearing along the dusty roads of the Northern Province, the front one with its heralding megaphone shouting "Malawi, Malawi, Malawi," then Doctor Banda's own Land Rover, where sits the great man himself with his chief lieutenant, dignified, calm, very much the prophet honored in his own land. And as they stop for petrol, the people of the hamlet appear from nowhere to clamour round, to chant songs in

praise of the leader, to struggle to touch his hand. It is a unique experience, as is also the expectation everywhere along Banda's speaking route that schools will stand empty and workshops idle as the Doctor addresses the faithful from the platforms which special Malawi squads have erected for him.

Malawi's Problems

Having seen all this, one can no longer doubt that Malawi is a national movement. But the second main impression one has is of Malawi's problems. In part these problems arise from the very fact that Malawi is a national movement, containing within itself so many elements which under other circumstances would be competitive or hostile.

Take that village meeting in the North. How is it going to be possible to reconcile the interests and influence of the village headman and the "emergent" Malawi branch officers? No doubt the Chairman—headmaster and choirmaster though he is, and appearing in church on Sunday in an immaculate blue suit—is today wearing a white toga as a token of acknowledgement of the African past. All the speakers are very careful to stress the loyalty of the people and the party to their chiefs—taking their cue from the party policy which speaks of "independence for the people of Nyasaland and their chiefs," greater opportunities for "the people and their chiefs," and the "unity of all the people and chiefs of Nyasaland." Yet the chairman's white toga is a tribute not to the tribal past of Nyasaland but to the Pan-Africanism which has proved so destructive of the tribal traditions elsewhere, and it is not to be wondered that the headman shakes his head a little when the meeting is invited to shout "To Hell with Tribalism" as well as "To Hell with Federation" and other more easily acceptable slogans.

And then what of the members of the Youth League, as they march down the hillside 20 minutes or so after the meeting has begun, with drums and chants and home-made party uniforms of their own? The future is with the youth, the speakers say. But are the elders altogether happy at the brashness of this youth, its readiness to interrupt the proceedings at inconvenient moments with shouts of "Kwaca" or "Freedom," its defiant suggestions that instead of the "Peace, Peace, Peace" which the Doctor has enjoined upon the meeting through the Branch delegates, there should be action taken against the "stooges"?



Dr. Hastings Banda

—B.I.S.

These reflections have relevance in a much wider context than a village meeting. The first, perhaps, can wait until after independence. Malawi has today the almost complete support of the chiefs: there is no point in anticipating the difficulties that will surely arise. But the second problem is a real and immediate one. How can Malawi control its enthusiasts? The young men must be kept at a pitch of enthusiasm but not allowed to carry it beyond bounds into a challenge of all constituted authority or into zealous "service" of the party where the party has no wish to be served. Every now and then this delicate balance fails—and a respected elder is beaten up as a "stooge" or an able and patriotic headmaster persecuted with libel, threat, and open disobedience by his own pupils.

Perils of Waiting

Here the problem of the young men merges with the general dilemma of Malawi in this waiting period. It has been clear to Dr. Banda that, before his talks in London in July, there was everything to be gained by order and peace and everything to be lost by disorder. It is clear to any observer that he and the other Malawi leaders are genuinely trying to achieve this. At the village meeting the theme of the need for peaceful conduct was reiterated time and time again.

Dr. Banda thanked the great Malawi Congress Party, said the Chairman, (Continued on page 10)

News Review

Ghana Celebrates Advent of Republic

Ghana became a republic within the British Commonwealth on July 1, and Dr. Kwame Nkrumah—the country's political leader for more than a decade—was sworn in as first president at a solemn ceremony in Accra, attended by President Sekou Toure of Guinea, Premier Sir Milton Margai of Sierra Leone, American and British government delegations, India's Krishna Menon, and many other leading citizens of friendly states. Gifts to the new President included a helicopter from the Soviet Union, a replica of the Cabinet Room furniture at 10 Downing Street from the United Kingdom, and a pair of white doves from Israel. A national election and referendum held simultaneously in May resulted in the change from dominion to republican status and the election of former Prime Minister Nkrumah as the first chief-of-state.

Although relations between Britain and Ghana remain warm, many of the Ghanaian Parliament's symbols of a British past have been Africanized to mark the advent of the republic. The Westminster-style mace, the Speaker's white wig, trumpet fanfares, and the center aisle dividing

the opposition from the governing party have given way to walls decorated with African art, a U-shaped seating arrangement, the use of talking drums as background for solemn ceremonies, and traditional Ghanaian dress for ceremonial occasions. In another symbolic act, President Nkrumah and his family moved into State House on June 30, after the last British Governor-General, Lord Listowel, left Accra for London.

Lord Listowel, who bade Ghana a formal farewell when he prorogued Parliament at midnight on June 30, told the National Assembly that the character of the changeover in Ghana was a tribute to the "genius of the people of Ghana." Such a transition as this one, "so often in the past only accomplished after bloodshed, bitterness, and revolution, has taken place in Ghana," he remarked, "with the utmost goodwill and without recrimination."

President Nkrumah, speaking at a farewell state dinner in honor of the retiring Governor-General, assured him that the change to a republic did not occur "through any lack of affection for Her Majesty or because of any dissatisfaction. . . . We have enacted for ourselves a new Constitution because it is our conviction that we need a form of government

which will more truly interpret the aspirations and hopes of the people of Ghana and give full expression to our African personality."

In a major policy speech at the formal state opening of Parliament on July 4, Dr. Nkrumah:

- Urged independent African states to join together to form the nucleus of a "non-nuclear world third force" comprising those nations of the world which desire to remain independent of both east and west, refuse "to allow their territories to be used as military bases," and reject "alliances dependent upon nuclear weapons."

- Emphasized Ghana's friendship for Britain and respect for the Commonwealth, but indicated that it would be "embarrassing" to remain indefinitely in the Commonwealth with apartheid-governed South Africa.

- Pledged Ghana's "every support" for the political bureau which the leaders of South Africa's banned nationalist organizations have set up in Ghana.

- Again denounced the French policy of testing nuclear weapons on African soil and stated that Ghana would, in concert with other African governments, "find ways of persuading the French or any other government to desist from such tests."

- Announced a new cabinet, cut from 23 to 15, but comprising familiar faces. K. A. Gbedemah remains Minister of Finance, Ako Adjei retains the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Krobo Edusei is still Minister of Transport and Communications. Kojo Botsio, formerly Minister of Economic Affairs, becomes Minister of Agriculture.

Dr. Nkrumah becomes Ghana's President

—Wide World



Entente States Seek Independence in August

Four more West African members of the French Community—the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger, and the Voltaic Republic—received a French Government pledge of full independence on July 11 in Paris. The four states, which have been loosely grouped since 1959 in a local federation known as the *Conseil de l'Entente*, have set the first week in August as the deadline for their independence, assuming that ratification of the agreements by the French and African Parliaments can be concluded by that time.

Unlike the Mali Federation and the Malagasy Republic, other French Community states which became independent in June, the *Entente* countries are refusing to negotiate post-independence accords of cooperation with France and with the Community

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until after independence is actually a fact and until France has submitted their candidacies to the United Nations. Obstinacy on this point is generally regarded as an effort by the leaders of the four nations to recoup domestic political losses resulting from their failure to get on the independence bandwagon earlier.

Agreement is also expected shortly on an independence timetable for the four Equatorial African states of the Community—Chad, the Congo Republic, and the Central African Republic (which are joining together to form a new Union of the Central African Republics), and Gabon, which is seeking independence as a separate unit. Negotiations for the independence of these latter states may take longer, since the procedure being followed is similar to that employed by the French Government with the Mali Federation and the Malagasy Republic—i.e., independence and cooperation agreements are being worked out simultaneously.

South Africa Releases 1200 Political Detainees

About 1200 of the political detainees in South Africa—held without charge since March or April—were freed early in July. The released prisoners were chosen from among the "less dangerous" detainees, but the more significant among the 1200 will still have their freedom restricted. They must obey a curfew, report daily to the police, communicate with no other ex-detainees, and keep away from the press. For violation of any of these regulations, they can be imprisoned for five years or fined £500. Colin Eglon, young Cape Town Progressive M.P., criticized the new restrictions, saying that the former prisoners were but half free "and to be half free is to be captive."

The government also reported that it had picked up 8600 African "idlers" during the emergency, but gave no indication of what had happened to them. The emergency has been withdrawn in more rural districts, but remains in force in the major cities.

Representation of Africans in the Union Parliament came to an end on June 30, when the terms of the Natives' Representatives expired. Last year's extension of the Bantu Self-Government Act provided for their elimination. Mrs. Margaret V.M.L. Ballinger, who had represented the Africans of the Eastern Cape for 22 years, Walter Stanford, a sharp debater, and Len Lee-Warden, reportedly a fellow-traveler of the Communists, were the three M.P.'s to leave. With the departure of Stanford and Mrs. Ballinger, the Liberal Party lost its parliamentary representation.



Somalia's new President Aden Abdullah Osman receives the key to the capital city of Mogadiscio. —Wide World

Compromise Candidate Named Somalia Premier

A surprise candidate became the first Prime Minister of the newly-independent Republic of Somalia on July 13 when President Aden Abdullah Osman named Dr. Abdi Rashid Shermarke, a 41-year-old deputy in the National Assembly, to head the government. Dr. Shermarke, who has a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Rome and was thereafter a civil servant until his election to Parliament last year, is a compromise choice. His selection is designed to resolve the tension which had developed between supporters of the Prime Minister of Somalia, Abdullahi Issa, and the Prime Minister of former British Somaliland, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal.

African Majority Sought By Banda at London

Dr. Hastings Banda, who was earlier reported "extremely displeased and insulted" by the numerical composition of the various Nyasaland delegations to the July-August constitutional talks in London on his country's future, has decided "after thinking things over" not to boycott the meetings. The Malawi Congress leader said he would go to London "purely and simply because I respect Mr. Macleod and also because I do not want to give ammunition to his political enemies both here and overseas."

The four seats allotted to the Malawi delegation will be filled by Dr. Banda, Kanyama Chiume, Orton Chirwa, and Aleke Banda. Sir Roy Welensky's United Federal Party will

send four delegates; the Congress Liberation Party, one; the Coloured community, one; and the Asian community, two.

On behalf of Nyasaland's Africans, Dr. Banda is calling for an absolute majority of Africans in both the Legislative and Executive Councils, and will seek to increase the size of the Legislative Council to at least 55 members and to introduce the Cabinet system of government "immediately."

Opposition Leaders Arrested in Volta

The government of President Maurice Yameogo of the Voltaic Republic has confirmed the arrest of the principal leaders of two proscribed opposition parties—the Republican Party for Liberty and the Peasant Action Party. In justifying the arrests, President Yameogo cited the publication by the opposition parties of an open letter to the government criticizing the "brutal and somewhat rowdy manner" in which the demand for independence had been presented in Paris and requesting a roundtable conference on the negotiations.

Togo-Ghana Dispute Eased by Lome Talks

Prime Minister Sylvanus Olympio of the Togo Republic and President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, whose recent verbal exchanges across their common border have raised speculation that their dispute might become the major frontier issue threatening intra-African consensus, got together for an unannounced three-hour talk in the Togo capital of Lome this month. The two statesmen did not resolve their fundamental disagreement over Dr. Nkrumah's argument that Togo, being a non-viable state and ethnically akin to Ghana, should be incorporated as a province of its larger neighbor. But their talks did "clear the air," and resulted in agreements to improve communications, increase economic cooperation, and get to know each other better.

Prime Minister Olympio's case for the legitimacy of his small country has had support in recent weeks from new quarters. UN economic experts who surveyed Togo recently have concluded that it can survive economically if it continues to budget in a businesslike fashion, keeps its plans for an expanded army within sharp bounds, and limits the number of embassies it establishes abroad. Moreover, nearly-independent Nigeria has reportedly given an informal promise to send its army and eight-ship navy to defend Togolese territorial integrity if necessary.

The Malawi Party: A Government in Waiting

(Continued from page 7)

for obtaining his release and hoped that it would continue to show the determination of the people of Nyasaland by enrolling more and more members and growing even stronger. It must be prepared for fresh sacrifices but for the moment everything was to be left to him. He would deal with the stooges; he would deal with the British Government. There were high hopes of success. The British were a brave people who respected courage in others; Mr. Macleod was a great man. The people must do nothing. Or the people must do nothing now. "The leopard," said the Chairman, "is a peaceful animal until provoked. But then, when he is provoked too much, he fights back and claws his attacker—like this and this and this," making great clawing sweeps with his arms.

Trouble in the North?

Malawi seems confident of its ability to control the leopard. But two things seem clear. One is that if Dr. Banda is given nothing in July which he can reasonably present as a concession of some significance, there is likely to be trouble in the North certainly and in the Cholo-Mlanje area probably, without any instructions from Malawi headquarters.

Even aside from the July talks, some spark could set trouble off: perhaps deliberate provocation of the sort that some observers are convinced the Federal Government is prepared to instigate in order to have a pretext to use its troops in Nyasaland; or perhaps a flare up in Northern Rhodesia. Banda's prestige in Nyasaland is immense but he is nevertheless only imperfectly in control of the situation. But only he has any chance to control it.

Coherent Policies Needed

There are other difficulties also in this waiting period. The time has come for hard thinking and planning on the future of an independent Nyasaland. Ideally, the time has come for an actual beginning on projects which will help to shape its society in the way which Malawi desires. Ideally, the rural development projects, the village cooperatives, which are designed to prevent the draining away of Nyasaland's young men, should be already on foot. Ideally, concrete plans should be being drawn for that university at Livingstonia which Dr. Banda wants "Now, now now". Ideally, indications should be being given to those few overseas business concerns which are showing an interest in investment in the sort of enterprise which Malawi is prepared to support. To many people in Nyasaland it does not look as though these things are being done.

There is as a result a great deal of

uncertainty. "Well, I'm all right," said a forester, "Orton Chirwa says he likes trees." But does Malawi favor the development of hotels and of the tourist industry? Does it approve of the building of a brewery? Does it intend to put an immediate stop to the recruiting of migrant labor? Does it intend to "nationalize" the tea estates? These are the sort of questions various very different people are asking. There are other uncertainties also. On what lines should the religious Missions plan their future educational and other expansion? What projects should the government initiate which it can be confident Malawi will carry through? It is not surprising that very little is being done in Nyasaland today either by government or by anyone else.

Is Planning Possible?

Easy though it is to criticize Malawi for its failure to give a lead, for its failure to formulate a coherent social and economic policy, such criticism is not really just. It is difficult for Malawi to engage in constructive social planning at the moment for two reasons. The first is that Malawi is a national movement. Its slogans of independence and secession meet universal support, but this unity depends to some extent upon concentration on these national objectives. As soon as social and economic policies begin to be formulated, there is bound to be disagreement and division. Malawi is by no means the only national movement which has played down issues which might divide it.

The second and more important reason is that, for all their confidence and strength, the Malawi leaders know that the battle is not yet won. This is not merely a waiting period which will certainly be followed by the achievement of self-government. The British Government may not, after all, give Malawi anything significant this year, even if the enthusiasts are kept in control. Possibly the temper is changing in England as a result of the Burton affair, the Corfield report on Mau Mau, events in the Belgian Congo. All of these might, however illogically, affect attitudes toward Nyasaland.

Europeans Calm

Moreover, the Malawi leaders do not under-estimate the resilience and resourcefulness of the Federal Government. It is striking to see the confidence of many Europeans in Nyasaland—a confidence based on their belief that the Federal Government will not desert them and knows how to handle the situation. Nyasaland, after all, can call on Federal troops and the Malawi leaders know that if it should ever come to a military show-

down they could not win a short-term victory. All this means that Malawi must necessarily still feel at war and that it has no leisure to plan for peace. So far from there being a relaxation of tension which would allow Malawi to make approaches to those government servants in whom they have confidence in order to develop co-ordinated plans, or to encourage the initiation of development projects in the villages, or to receive the advances of business with a reasonable lack of suspicion, there is at the moment increasing tension.

Despite, then, the strength and popularity of Malawi, things could still go very wrong for them. Despite the occasional excesses of Malawi supporters and the occasional crudities of Malawi propaganda, all men of good will must hope that things do not go wrong. Malawi is the only hope for a solution in Nyasaland and the sooner this is accepted by all parties the better the chance of the solution being a satisfactory one.

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Is Authoritarian Rule Inevitable in Africa?

By HARVEY GLICKMAN

From Empire to Nation, The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples, by Rupert Emerson, (Cambridge: Harvard University 1960), 466 pages, \$7.75.

The Politics of the Developing Areas, edited by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 591 pages, \$10.

Last month this department called for a concerted effort to synthesize what we know about Africa. Somewhat adventitiously, this month we confront two sophisticated works directed precisely to this end—and beyond. Taken together, they comprise the most thorough and complete examination we have of politics—international and domestic—in what we used to call “the underdeveloped territories.” While ranging widely over time and space, the authors (two of whom—Professors Emerson and Coleman—are well-known to “Africanists”) manage to draw together and analyze an astonishing quantity of information on African society and political development.

Perhaps most striking to the reader unacquainted with current schools of thought in American political science is the extent to which the authors agree in their interpretations—in fact, arriving at similar propositions—although their approaches to the subject differ so obviously. As far as political studies are concerned, the books are in different areas. Professor Emerson writes in the common-sense, historical tradition of the study of international relations and considers primarily “the great issues of nationalism and self-determination.” Professors Almond and Coleman, on the other hand, represent “the new wave” of behavioral science, as applied to the study of comparative government. Theirs is an attempt to increase our understanding of all political systems, ultimately aspiring to “a probabilistic theory of the polity.”

It is a tribute to the utility of both methods of inquiry—and to the acuity of the investigators—that Professors Emerson and Coleman can complement each other. Professor Almond writes the introduction on methodology, which constructed the common framework for the analyses on various “developing areas” by the book’s five “co-authors.” Professor Coleman wrote the chapter on sub-Saharan

Africa as well as the conclusion, which compares all the political systems previously analyzed. It is his work, therefore, with which we are largely concerned here.

Apart from many identical, specific observations on the consequences of the Western impact, e.g., the differential effects of British and French colonial administration in Africa, several important similarities stand out in the two books. Both Emerson and Coleman separate the problems of Latin America from those of Afro-Asia—the former by what one suspects is intuitive design, the latter as a result of systematic comparison. (Among other things, this ought to have significant implications for American foreign policy.) In addition, both authors agree on the positive



contributions of colonialism in Africa toward political, social, and economic development. For better or worse, “overseas imperialism [is] . . . the instrument by which the spiritual, scientific, and material revolution which began in Western Europe with the Renaissance was spread to the rest of the world,” states Professor Emerson. He goes on to point out “the disadvantages of non-colonial imperialism and of nationalism in non-colonial conditions—both of which, in general terms, are poorer in their economic inheritance and in democratic institutions.” Following this same line of reasoning, Professor Coleman concludes that “it is likely that the rate of social mobilization has been higher in Africa than in any other underdeveloped area of the world.”

The “Laws” of Nationalism

Both books also propose comparable “laws” governing the development of nationalist movements. Coleman, speaking specifically of “the process of political recruitment” (part of the process of “socialization” and one of

Two sophisticated works explore the “laws” of nationalist movements and the trend toward “executive predominance” in rule-making.

the four “input functions” of the political system), discerns four periods, characterized in turn by “accommodation,” “agitation,” “maneuver” and “consolidation.” Professor Emerson, using cruder tools, distinguishes three “phases of reaction” by colonial peoples to the Western impact: “xenophobic defense of the existing order,” “self-humiliation and acceptance of alien superiority,” and “a nationalist synthesis” of local pride and Western values.

Finally, in combination these works make the definitive case for recognizing the causes, the uses, and possibly the desirability of “centralism” in the politics and government of Afro-Asia. There are, however, slight differences of emphasis. Professor Emerson views authoritarianism as a kind of historical necessity, as well as the repetition of a Western pattern of post-medieval vintage.

While Professor Coleman also observes “executive pre-dominance in rule-making,” “increased politicization of the bureaucracies,” the vital importance of “the comprehensive nationalist party,” and “the general trend throughout the non-Western world . . . toward centralism,” nevertheless he notes the strong racial and tribal pluralism of the non-West and particularly in Africa. There, at least, “it could be argued that such a rich pluralism makes dictatorship less likely by providing countervailing power centers which cannot be coerced into a single authoritarian system.”

Emerson’s Style Fresh

Readers inclined to be wary of “scientific” social studies will delight in the bracing skepticism of Professor Emerson toward received doctrines. Sweeping along in a fresh, yet forceful style that often belies its profundity, he refuses to dodge the great questions that have teased generations of scholars, merely because the issues are age-old. The sources of imperialism and their relation to capitalism, the nature of nations and nationality, the conditions and substance of nationalism and their links to democracy, self-determination and its relevance to plural societies—all are carefully explored. In the process, much of the cant and mythology invented by both the vested interests and the rising new classes is exploded and cleared away.

From Empire to Nation is not a comforting book. Professor Emerson

makes plain that violence, more often than not, presides over the final settlement of issues with which reason painfully grappled. Though conceding some of the "virtues of nationalism," he finds it useless in tackling the problems of development in the future. "The task of bringing Asian and African societies into a modern Western-style world will, in general, be long and hazardous, accompanied by almost as much backsliding as advance." To the extent that modernization proceeds "successfully," it will probably be accompanied by instability, threats to peace and the incursions of Communists.

"Concepts" or Vocabulary

More daring readers may prefer *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. Although the vocabulary may appear opaque and the analytical framework overbearing and rigid, they enable observers to see political processes in a new light and they permit numerous and suggestive links among a variety of social phenomena to be uncovered, established, and even "proven."

In examining the contribution of Professor Almond, it suffices to note that he recognizes the shortcomings of the theory of politics that he presents for the substantive efforts that follows. It is possible to wonder whether the "functional categories"

The Author

Regular readers of this department will be interested to learn that Book Editor Harvey Glickman has accepted a post as Assistant Professor of Political Science at Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania. Dr. Glickman previously taught at Princeton University.

provide "concepts," as he claims, or merely vocabulary. Professor Coleman, for one, carefully keeps the method tentative and periodically suggests reservations. Also, as Almond indicates at length, much more must be done in order to analyze formal governmental structures. (For instance, one cannot altogether dismiss the role and importance of constitutions in Africa, especially in plural societies.)

Nevertheless, the aims and sectors of attention suggested by Almond are laudable. "If we are to improve our capacity for explaining and predicting the directions of political change, and in particular the prospects of democratic modernization in these areas, it is more important to analyze their traditional cultures, the impact of Western and other influences on them, their political socialization and recruitment practices, and their political 'infrastructures'—interest groups, political parties and media of communication."

All the studies in the politics of the developing areas enable Coleman in the concluding chapter to suggest

"propositions regarding relationships and developmental patterns in the process of modernization." Perhaps most impressive is the examination of the widely-held assumption that economic development contributes to political competitiveness. (It seems to be "true" in general, but less so in individual cases.) This effort, plus the construction of a six-phase "developmental syndrome" for Afro-Asian countries, deserve close attention.

South Africa, Two Views of Separate Development, by S. Pienaar and Anthony Sampson, (London and New York: Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Institute of Race Relations, 1960), 81 pages, \$1.25.

Constitution-making for a Democracy, An Alternative to Apartheid, by D. V. Cowen, (Johannesburg: Anglo-American Corp., 1960), 41 pages, supplement to *Optima*, March 1960.

If reason, concern, or tears alone could solve problems, the South African crisis would have vanished long ago. A booklet by Mr. Cowen, the Professor of Comparative Law at the University of Cape Town, demonstrates all three of the aforementioned approaches, as well as wisdom and scholarship, yet it fails to quell the gnawing mixture of despondency and horror that must overcome every observer of the South African scene. The violence of a few months ago, coupled with an acquaintance with Afrikaner Nationalist thinking—as exemplified by the contribution of Mr. Pienaar, the Foreign Editor of *Die Burger*—tend to destroy all attempts at political persuasion.

Professor Cowen's "constructive alternative" will appeal to everyone in South Africa, except those in power and their supporters. He proposes alteration of the Constitution to transform gradually the society into "a non-racial democracy," but with safeguards for minority rights. One suspects that the Afrikaner answer is in Mr. Pienaar's words: "A constitution can be no more than an expression of a political fact." That fact today points in the direction of national suicide.

American readers will be impressed with the wholesale adoption of a Bill of Rights, judicial review, and territorial federalism. But many may doubt the efficacy of "racial federalism," both in logic and in practice. The suggested parallel of Czechoslovakia is singularly unconvincing. In all fairness, it must be added that Professor Cowen wrote his essay in August and September 1959 and revised it in January 1960. Perhaps events later would have undermined his tempered optimism.

Mr. Pienaar's essay precedes one of opposing views by Mr. Sampson, the former editor of *Drum* and now on the staff of *The Observer*. Although neither writer saw the contribution

of the other, it is difficult to see how any neutral reader (are there any?) cannot agree that Mr. Sampson demolishes Mr. Pienaar's arguments. The basic—and tragic—error that Afrikaner Nationalists make is to view the problem of African nationalism as the mirror-image of their own. "The Bantu nationalities"—if such things exist—are not represented by the rural remnants of tribes in the Reserves, nor are they bent on preserving separate customs and traditions. It is the demands of the urban Africans, whose "main desire is to be part of the main stream of Western civilization, not to be separated from it," that must be faced.

Someone once remarked that the noises of Afrikanerdom recall the aggrieved tone and belligerence of Germany between the wars. Herein lies the lesson.

SHORT NOTES:

1. *East African Explorers*, selected and introduced by Charles Richards and James Place, (London: Oxford University Press, World's Classics #572, 1960), 356 pp., \$2.75. A companion piece to collections on South Africa and West Africa in the same series. These writings serve three functions admirably. They provide invaluable original sources of evidence—however biased—of traditional Africa; they permit a glance into the mind and heart of nineteenth century imperialism; they enable a sedentary generation to exhilarate in the high adventure of discovery and exploration.

2. *African Development and Education in Southern Rhodesia* by Franklin Parker, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, International Education Monographs #2, 1960), 165 pp., \$1.75. The result of a year of field research, it is a useful, balanced guide to the background and constituent elements of "the school crisis in Southern Rhodesia." (See also the same author's "Secondary Schools for African Negroes in Southern Rhodesia," *Texas Journal of Secondary Education*, vol. 13, winter 1960; "Pass-carrying Requirements for African Negroes in Southern Rhodesia," *The Negro History Bulletin*, vol. 23, April 1960.)

3. *African Voices, An Anthology of Native African Writing*, compiled and edited by Peggy Rutherford, (NY: Vanguard Press, 1960), 208 pp., \$3.95. "The first collection of native writing to be published in this country." Vibrant, earthy, enchanting, and often poignant.

4. *Official Publications of Somaliland, 1941-1959, A Guide*, compiled by Helen Conover, (Washington: Library of Congress, 1960), 41 pp., 45¢—available from the Card Division. Valuable bibliography.

5. *INTERCOM*, World Affairs Center, 345 East 46th St., NYC 17, NY, Vol. 2, No. 4, May 1960, "Focus on Africa South of the Sahara," \$1.20.

How Lumumba Came to Power

(Continued from page 2)

tween the PSA and the ABAKO, holding respectively 34 and 32 seats. The remaining 24 seats are largely shared by the *Luka*, a sub-group of the PNP identified with the Bayaka peoples of the Kwango district, and the *Front Commun*, a roof-organization remarkable for the variety of its political components. It includes, among other groups, the dissident wing of the ABAKO led by Daniel Kanza, Bolikango's PUNA, the MNC-Lumumba and members of the UNIMO residing in Leopoldville.

(4) In Equator Province, 28 seats out of 60 are in the hands of candidates who ran on independent lists. The MNC-Lumumba obtained 10 seats, Bolikango's PUNA 9, the UNIMO 8, and the PNP 5.

(5) In the Katanga, the battle for ballots was particularly tight between the CONAKAT and the Balubakat; the Assembly is almost equally divided between the two major contestants, with the CONAKAT holding 32 seats out of 60.

(6) In the Kivu, the CEREA won 30 seats out of 70 but is weakened dangerously by a division of its leadership. The remaining seats are largely shared by the ARP (*Alliance Rurale Progressiste*) and the PNP.

Belgian Procedures Used

The elections to the federal and provincial assemblies were held concurrently; however, candidates were selected from different lists and in different constituencies. Polling took place on May 20 and 21 in the Congo's



Congo Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko (center) with Dr. Ralph Bunche and Lt. Col. Frank Merritt, USAF, at Leopoldville airport. —Wide World

144 electoral districts. The method of election was patterned on the system of electoral representation applied in Belgium and known as *scrutin de liste a un tour*. Under this system, the number of votes cast for each slate of candidates is divided by 1, 2, 3 and so on depending on the number of seats available in each constituency. The resulting figures, known as "electoral quotients," are then rated in order of importance to determine the number of seats to be allotted to each party.

The legal prescriptions regarding the eligibility of candidates varied depending on whether they were running for office at the national or provincial level. Aspirants to federal offices had to be at least 25 years of age, registered in the appropriate electoral districts, domiciled in the Congo for at least five years, and born of Congolese parents or of a Congolese mother.

As in most political parties in Africa, a formal nomination procedure seldom took place. It was, as a high-ranking official of Mr. Lumumba's party put it, a "family affair". The presence of individual lists, totally unrelated to any of the officially registered parties, provides a clue to some of the conflicts over nominations.

In Leopoldville Province, for instance, no less than 44 lists competed for seats in the Provincial Assembly and three for seats in the Chamber of Representatives. In a few isolated cases, candidates who failed to secure the nomination for their party ran for office on a ticket which had already fallen into oblivion—a common occurrence in countries where parties are either short-lived or inclined toward frequent face-lifting. In one of Leopoldville's electoral districts,

for example, Mr. Cauwenberghe, former chairman of the defunct ASSO-RECO (*Association des Ressortissants du Congo*), bolted the *Front Commun* of Mr. Bolikango and ran on an ASSORECO ticket.

"National" parties were more susceptible to the conflicts about nominations, especially when leading personalities were assigned constituencies in distant provinces. This "parachuting" of central party officials into local contests alienated potential local candidates and sometimes induced them to join one of the opposition groups. This was relatively rare, however, since the "national" parties, in most cases, followed a strategy of local alliances whenever local circumstances permitted. Thus, the MNC-Lumumba entered an alliance with Bolikango's *Front Commun* in Leopoldville Province, and with the *Lulua Freres* in the Kasai, while the PNP joined forces with the *Merdeco* in the Equatorial Province, and the MNC-Kalonji with the *Balubakat* in the Kasai.

One feature of the electoral system which may yet engender conflicts within the parties' leadership is the preferential ballot. By casting his ballot for a candidate of his choice instead of for a list as a whole, the voter could, in effect, alter the order of priority reflected by the respective positions of the candidates on the list. In Leopoldville Province, for example, Edmond Nzeza Landu, founder of the ABAKO, was elected to the Chamber of Representatives by an overwhelming number of preferential votes. In view of Mr. Nzeza's low-ranking position on the ABAKO list, his election to the Chamber would have been most improbable if it had not been for the preferential ballot. After the elections, ABAKO President Joseph Kasavubu issued a communique which accused some party members of contravening his instructions by resorting to preferential voting.

Role of Press and Oral Propaganda

The electoral campaign was carried out with the aid of two principal media: the parties' press and oral propaganda. The latter was conducted in the bush through political meetings and rallies held on the village "square," but these gatherings were not very competitive since each party, especially in Leopoldville Province, concentrated its efforts on specific areas staked out according to their ethnic composition. In the native districts of Leopoldville, the electoral campaign was carried on with a far greater intensity and more impressive mobilization of party machinery. Loudspeaker vans spinning out endless litanies were a common spectacle in the *cite indigene*. The political agitation resulted in bloodshed on several occasions, especially in the Kasai, where the feud between the Lulua and the Baluba tribes reached its climax shortly before election day. Similar

AAI Earmarks \$140,000 To Aid African Students

A total of more than \$140,000 will be awarded by the African-American Institute to over 200 African students for study in American universities during the 1960-61 academic year beginning in September.

The sum covers a three-phase student assistance program:

(1) Supplemental study grants to African students already in the United States. This year 160 Africans—selected by the Scholarship Committee of the Board of Trustees on the basis of their academic records, the usefulness of their programs, and the recommendation of their teachers—will receive such assistance.

(2) Full scholarships for competitively selected students brought here from Africa for work toward a degree in an American university. The Institute has 20 students in institutions of higher learning on full scholarships at the present time and will bring 15 additional students over in September.

(3) A small aid fund to assist students in case of emergency.

casualties were reported from Elisabethville, in the Katanga, where clashes recurred between the militants of the *Balubakat*.

Leopoldville is Newspaper Center

The nationalist press was represented in Leopoldville by 14 newspapers and periodicals, printed in French, Kikongo, and Lingala. Aside from the *PNP* (derisively referred to by other parties as *Le Parti Des Negres Payes*), and the *PUNA*, both of which refrained from flogging the moribund horse of colonialism, the deeds of the Belgian administration were the main target of the party propagandists.

Campaign techniques varied considerably from one group to the other. Some parties attempted to drive a wedge between an opponent and his following, pointing to the opposing leader's connections with the Belgian administration, his tribalist leanings, or his "separatist" tendencies. Others, such as the *ABAKO*, stressed the virtues of particular tribes or revived the image of an idyllic past. Some, conscious of the economic advantages derived by Congolese from the European presence, made grudging promises concerning foreign-owned property.

Lumumba Combines Techniques

Each of the afore-mentioned techniques was handled by Mr. Lumumba with notable skill and a particularly fortunate sense of timing. He managed to earn the support of the Lulua in the Kasai, won over a considerable segment of Mr. Kalonji's following from the rival *MNC* wing, aligned himself with customary chiefs where this was advantageous, and also won many undecided voters by portraying himself as a victim of the Belgian administration.

Other factors account for Mr. Lumumba's victory at the polls besides his campaign strategy, however. One is the traditional context in which his party operates. There seems to be a direct relationship between the appeal of the *MNC* in certain provinces and the degree of disruption which has occurred in the traditional structures of those provinces. It is in the "shatter-zone" areas—where customary authorities have either disappeared or have been artificially created by the Belgian administration, as in the Orientale Province, and more specifically in the Ituri district—that the *MNC* victory was most resounding. The state of social disintegration in urban areas, and especially in Stanleyville, where few tribal associations exist, found an immediate expression in the voters' need to identify with a leader who could meet their expectations.

Another element which accounts for the *MNC*'s victory is the personality of its chairman. The prestige enjoyed by Lumumba is not derived from his educational background, which is rather limited. It lies main-

ly in his charismatic qualities, which are further enhanced by the aura of fame conferred on all Congolese "prison graduates" who have been incarcerated by the colonial administration for "subversive activities". The devotion of the *MNC* members to their Chairman is clearly illustrated by the following homage which appeared in a recent issue of the party organ, *Independence*:

"Patrice Lumumba, you are the man we need, you are our hope and the hope of our future . . . Martyr of freedom, child of our fatherland, symbol of freedom, protector of our ancestors' rights, valiant soldier, let your agonizing enemies watch your triumph and our glory."

The "personalization" of power is the distinctive characteristic of the *MNC* organization: party directives do not depend for their legitimacy on procedural or statutory niceties but on the will of its chairman.

Belgian Taint Avoided

A third explanatory factor lies in the doctrinal orientation of the *MNC*. Aside from Mr. Kalonji's party—which became increasingly suspect of exclusive sympathy for the Baluba—Mr. Lumumba's party is the only one which could reasonably claim its "national" vocation and yet avoid the charge of being a *parti de l'administration*. Furthermore, as a staunch supporter of a unitary form of government, the *MNC* directed its appeal to that vast majority of voters whose tribal affiliations were either too tenuous to command particularistic loyalties or too strong to avert the danger of "balkanization."

The character of the future Congolese polity was described in one of the resolutions adopted at the *MNC* Congress in Luluabourg in the following terms:

"The Congress favors the constitution of a unitary state with wide administrative decentralization and a certain degree of autonomy for each of the six provinces insofar as matters of provincial interest are concerned."

This syllable statement, designed to reconcile the conflicting aspirations of "unitarists" and "federalists," was followed by a strong warning against "the type of federalism which is advocated today by certain Congolese and which is likely to lead to ethnic separatism and tribal war."

Pragmatism Characterizes Lumumba

Electoral circumstances have so far inhibited the formulation of social and economic policies beyond the implications of the foregoing statements. Although Lumumba is suspected of Marxist leanings by his right-wing detractors, his ideas are actually shaped by practical considerations rather than doctrinal imperatives. His dedication to the Pan-African goal and his admiration for Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah provide

a clue to the future orientation of Prime Minister Lumumba's government.

As an active participant in the Pan-African Conference held in Accra in December 1958 and member of its Permanent Directing Committee, Lumumba developed some progressive plans of liberation which will have a direct influence on political developments in some of the seven states bordering the Congo if he retains power. The close ties existing between Mr. Lumumba's party and the *UNAR* (*Union Nationale Ruandaïse*)—the most active of the nationalist parties presently operating in the trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi—suggest another *MNC* objective.

Formation of the Cabinet

The details of the protracted negotiations which preceded the investiture of Prime Minister Lumumba's broad coalition government on June 23, barely a week before the date of independence, admittedly contain more than an element of *opera-bouffe*. The *Chambre des Représentants*—by 74 voices—and the Senate—by 60—gave their reluctant support on that date to what appears to be the most disparate cabinet which could possibly be anticipated.

In line with Belgian parliamentary tradition, Ganshoff Van Der Meersch, Minister in charge of General Affairs in Africa, called on Mr. Lumumba shortly after the election results were in to explore what possible combinations—if any—could be worked out among the leaders of the many and diversified contending groups. Abandoning the solution of a *cartel des gauches*, which would have included his own party, the *PSA*, and the *CEREA*, Mr. Lumumba from the outset recognized the need to extend his bases of support in order to win the required majority in the Chambers. After a period of uneasy and wide-ranging overtures, marked by the sudden defection of Moïse Tshombe's *CONAKAT*, Mr. Ganshoff issued a brief communique on June 17 indicating that "the *informateur* had failed in the mission which had been entrusted to him." Mr. Kasavubu then entered the path which others feared to tread, but Mr. Ganshoff soon found that this second choice had in effect elicited even less enthusiasm among the prospective *Ministres*.

Mr. Ganshoff's ultimate decision to call again on Mr. Lumumba came as an obvious anti-climax among most of the Bakongo peoples. On June 24, however, a new wave of enthusiasm swept across the Lower Congo as "King Kasavubu" was formally elected Head of the State by a clear majority (154 voices against 44) in a joint session of the two Houses. Kasavubu's election was the result of a conscious effort on the part of the *MNC* and *ABAKO* leaders to resolve their conflicting aspirations.

The uneven distribution of some 23

(Continued next page, col. 3)



Left to right: Tunisia's Mongi Slim with Congo's UN delegate Thomas Kanza and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Andre Mandi. —Wide World

Mutiny in the Congo: the Linchpin Gives Way

(Continued from page 4)

Congo's 13,000,000 people had descended into "a long night" of chaos and savagery. Such all-inclusive reporting, and there has been much of it, failed to note that the civilian population of the Congo was not generally involved in the uprising, and that not even all sectors of the *Force Publique* were in mutiny. Tunisian Ambassador Mongi Slim made this point in the all-night session of the Security Council on July 13, and also called to the delegates' attention the absence of any confirmed European casualties prior to the intervention of Belgian troops.

Even as late as July 14, *New York Times* Correspondent Henry Tanner reported that identifying three newspaper men as Americans rather than Belgians "unbelievably turned a mob into a laughing, cheering crowd that pressed forward to hug the Americans and shake their hands." Missionaries interviewed by Tanner also assured him that they had not been molested until rumors about the nature of the Belgian military intervention set the troops in their area into a new wave of anger. Of those missionaries now returned to the United States, only a minority actually experienced manhandling at the hands of the mutineers. Many "grave acts"—to use Ambassador Slim's phrase—have been committed in the Congo these past few weeks, but the percentage of the total population involved was, by the third week in July, still small and the focus of attack primarily the Belgian military. However, unemployment, disorder, and spreading rumors that Belgium had declared war on the Congo Republic were beginning to have their effect on the less stable elements in urban areas.

Extent of Rape

Some of the actions of the mutinous troops which appear most illogical to the outside observer assume a somewhat different pattern if viewed in context. The attacks on European

women, many in the Congo believe, were a product of heavy drinking and a gesture of revenge for humiliations suffered in the past. But it probably should also be taken into account that some politicians had led the Congolese people to believe that independence would deliver to them not only the jobs, the cars, and the government houses heretofore enjoyed by Belgians but also their personal property. And to many Congolese soldiers, a woman is still regarded as "property."

Cameras Feared

The recurrent reports of attacks on newspapermen and other persons carrying cameras can apparently be traced to the administration's use of published photographs of the political riots of January 1959 as admissible evidence in convicting participants. The breakdown of communications to the outside world was not, as first reported, the result of Congolese guerrilla activity, but simply a result of the flight of the Belgian technicians operating these facilities.

Similarly, there are two versions of the efforts of Congolese troops to cut off the exodus of fleeing Belgians, which the more alarmist reports described as a new effort to ravage and terrorize. The Associated Press, on the other hand, reported that some mutineers were "amazed at the reaction they had set off" and had desperately tried to prevent the Europeans from leaving because they realized that the country could not be operated without their technical help.

Plugging the Dike

Whatever criticisms one might make of the political decisions of the officials of the Congo Government in recent weeks, due credit must be given to their physical courage in the first days of the break-down of public order.

That the country did not descend even further into chaos in the 10 days before the United Nations Emergency Force arrived to sort out the rubble

must be credited in large part to the dogged efforts of President Joseph Kasavubu, Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, and Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko to plug the dike at each new leak.

Although they did not always speak with a single voice and sometimes were not even speaking to each other, these three officials displayed a rare degree of physical courage as they moved ceaselessly from one trouble spot to another—reassuring imperiled Europeans and entreating the rebels in an effort to curb the violence and stop the exodus of civilians. Premier Lumumba's trip south from Leopoldville to meet a column of troops marching toward the capital from Thysville on the first day of the revolt doubtless warded off a major blood bath. Foreign Minister Bomboko, described by the *London Times* correspondent on July 11 as an exhausted man who had not then slept for five straight nights, earned widespread respect for his heroic efforts to protect Europeans and Africans alike.—H.K.

Congo's Lumumba

(Continued from previous page)

ministerial chairs among 12 different parties was by itself a symptom of the fragility of the coalition. Prime Minister Lumumba's *MNC* effectively controlled eight ministries, the *Parti Solidaire Africain* three, the *CEREA* two, while the remaining nine offices were equally shared among the lesser members of the cabinet, namely the *PNP*, *UNIMO*, *CONAKAT*, *PUNA*, *ABAKO*, *ASSORECO*, *UNC*, and Independents.

The position occupied by each of the afore-mentioned participants throws a revealing light on the degree of cohesion prevailing among them; four key ministries are held by the *MNC*: National Defense, controlled, significantly enough, by Mr. Lumumba himself, Interior (Christian Gbenye), Economic Co-ordination (Alois Kabanga), and Agriculture (Joseph Lutula). Antoine Gizenga, leader of the *Parti Solidaire Africain*, holds the post of Deputy Prime Minister, while Jacques Masena and Pierre Mulele, also of the *PSA*, are respectively in charge of Labor and National Education. Anicet Kashamura and Marcel Bisukiro, of the *CEREA*, are in charge of two important ministries, Commerce and "Information and Cultural Affairs." Albert Delvaux, leader of the *PNP*, has been given the symbolic mission of representing the Congo in Belgium as *Ministre Resident en Belgique*—an ironic homage paid to the political affinities of the *PNP* leader.

The *ABAKO*, emerging from the elections as the third largest party, only secured one ministerial post (Finance). It is also represented in the government by one Secretary of State and one Minister of State, both chosen from the rank-and-file of their party.

Visitors

UMAR IBRAHIM, Alkali (chief magistrate) of Kaduna, Nigeria, here on a 60-day US State Department leader exchange grant. Programmed by the American Council on Education, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

HASAN ABDALLA EL TURABI, formerly an instructor at the University of Khartoum and now completing a Doctorate in Law at the University of Paris, here for a 60-day US State Department leader exchange grant. Programmed by the American Friends of the Middle East, 1607 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

CHARLES POATY, Pointe Noire, Congo Republic, studying at the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de la France d'Outre-Mer*, here for a 60-day US State Department leader exchange grant. Programmed by the African-American Institute, Suite 505, Dupont Circle Building, Washington, DC.

LOUIS GUIRANDOU-N'DIAYE, formerly assistant to the Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior, Abidjan, and now studying at the *Institut des Hautes Etudes de la France d'Outre-Mer*, here for a 60-day US State Department leader exchange grant. Programmed by the African-American Institute.

ADOLPHUS U.D. MBAH, Member of the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives for Owerri North and Secretary-General of the Shell-BP Oil Workers Union, here for a 120-day US State Department specialist grant. Programmed by the Department of Labor's Office of International Labor Affairs.

D. CAESAR HARRIS, Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of the Liberian Coast Guard, here for a 60-day US State Department leader exchange grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute, 1722 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC.

MOHAMED SCEK HASSAN, Consular Attache for the Somalia Government in the Italian Consulate General in Cairo, here for a 60-day US State Department leader exchange grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

THOMAS DECKER, Deputy Director of Information, Freetown, Sierra Leone, here for a 60-day US State Department leader exchange grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

GHEBREMICHAEL BESERAT, managing editor of Eritrea's official government newspaper, *Zemen*, here for a 120-day US State Department specialist grant. Programmed by the Governmental Affairs Institute.

Institute Undertakes Program For Guinea

The African-American Institute has signed a contract with the International Cooperation Administration to select approximately 150 students from the Republic of Guinea and place them in American academic, governmental, and industrial institutions, over a three year period. The students, who will include candidates for academic degrees as well as technical trainees, will come to this country at a rate of approximately 50 per year.

The Institute also has reached a private agreement with the Guinea Government to provide 25 French-speaking secondary school teachers in the fields of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Natural Sciences, and English for the school year beginning September 1960.

Calendar

August 9-16: The 25th Congress of Orientalists, to be held in Moscow, USSR.

August 27-31: 14th Plenary Assembly of Pax Romana-International and Cultural Affairs, at Tioumliline, Morocco, to discuss African Affairs.

September 5-7: Third Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, in Hartford, Connecticut, to discuss "Patterns and Problems of Unification in Africa". For details, contact William A. Hance, Executive Secretary, African Studies Association, 409 West 117th Street, New York 27, N.Y.

September 19-22: Meeting of the International Institute of Differing Civilizations, in Munich, Germany, to discuss "Staff Problems in Tropical and Sub-Tropical Countries".

African Unity Is Doubtful, Says Nigerian

The dynamics of American politics and Nigerian-US economic cooperation were the principal interests of an unprecedented bevy of top-ranking Nigerian leaders who have just completed visits to this country. Attracting the most attention has been the Prime Minister of Nigeria's Northern Region, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, and his extensive party of Regional Ministers and other officials—including the Emir of Kano, Alhaji Sir Muhammadu Sanusi; Minister of Education Alhaji Isa Kaita; Minister of Land and Survey M. Ibrahim Musa Gashash; and Minister of Works G. U. Ohikere. Other prominent Nigerian visitors included T. O. S. Benson, Federal Minister of Information; Jaja Wachuku, Speaker of the Federal House of Representatives; and Minister of Internal Affairs Alhaji Usman Sarki.

In an address to the Overseas Press Club in New York, the Prime Minister of the Northern Region—whose Northern People's Congress controls 150 seats in Nigeria's 312-seat Federal Parliament—expressed his doubt concerning the practicality of current proposals for a "united states of West Africa." "The standard of living of most of our people is too low," Sir Ahmadu said, "our social services are too limited, our agriculture needs developing and industry is only just starting. These are grave and serious problems and in my view we must deal with them before we take on more and unknown problems."

"In the future, some form of West African Union may be beneficial. I do not rule it out. But I am a practical man. I have spent all my life dealing with the problems connected with governing men. I therefore believe in dealing with problems as they arise and not in creating difficulties which do not exist."

From New York, where they conferred with UN officials and groups from the Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller foundations regarding Nigeria's technical and economic needs, the Northern Nigerian party went on to Washington to meet with State Department and ICA officials. They also attended the Democratic Convention in Los Angeles and visited San Francisco, Chicago, Nashville, and Boston briefly.

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